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Lockhart v. Fretwell: Using Hindsight to Evaluate Prejudice in
Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
It is the nightmare of every criminal defendant facing the death pen-
alty: His attorney makes a mistake during the penalty phase of the trial, and
as a result, the jury returns a death sentence rather than life imprisonment.
To guard against such injustice, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel protects against "ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel."'  In Strickland v. Washington,2 decided in
1984, the Court had recognized that defendants are entitled to relief if they
can establish deficient performance and prejudice During its October
1992 term, in Lockhart v. Fretwell,4 the Supreme Court re-examined Strick-
land's prejudice component. The Court clarified that prejudice exists when
counsel's errors render the proceeding fundamentally unfair or make the
result unreliable,5 but only when counsel's errors deprive the defendant of
a substantive or procedural right.6 The Court also addressed whether a sub-
sequent change in the law can affect the prejudice determination.7 Answer-
ing in the affirmative, the Court held that prejudice may be assessed from
the vantage point of hindsight.8
At issue was the defendant Fretwell's right to object to the "double-
counting" of aggravating factors under the Eighth Circuit's decision in Col-
lins v. Lockhart.9 Defense counsel failed to make the Collins objection, and
the jury returned a sentence of death, rather than life imprisonment.' 0
Fretwell asserted that counsel's failure to object amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel, even though the Eighth Circuit overruled Collins after
Fretwell's trial." The Court held that Fretwell no longer had a right to
prevent the "double-counting" of aggravating circumstances and therefore
suffered no prejudice from counsel's failure to object. 2 In her concurring
opinion, Justice O'Connor explained that when defendants seek to benefit
1. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164-65 (1986); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
686 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 n.14 (1970).
2. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
3. Id. at 687.
4. 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
5. Id. at 840.
6. Id. at 843.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 844.
9. 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985), overruled by Perry v. Lock-
hart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
10. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 841.
11. Id. at 842; Perry, 871 F.2d at 1391.
12. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844.
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from an objection that no longer has merit under present law, they claim the
"luck of a lawless decisionmaker," which Strickland prohibits. 13 Con-
versely, Justice Stevens's dissent argued that the subsequent fairness of a
defendant's conviction or sentence is irrelevant; Justice Stevens asserted
that Strickland prohibits the use of hindsight in the prejudice inquiry. 14
The Fretwell Court also held that "new rules" of criminal procedure
restricting the rights of habeas petitioners may be applied retroactively. 5
The Court found that such application does not violate the nonretroactivity
rule of Teague v. Lane,' 6 which prohibits defendants from claiming the ben-
efit of a "new rule" of criminal procedure announced after their convictions
or sentences became final.17 The dissent, on the other hand, charged that
allowing states to benefit from a "new rule" that erodes the rights of defend-
ants, while not permitting the defendants to benefit from the new rules,
violates fundamental notions of fairness and equality.18
This Note explores the reasoning of the majority, concurring, and dis-
senting opinions in Fretwell.19 It outlines the history of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance20 and specifically traces the development
of the prejudice requirement.2" The Note then discusses the Strickland v.
Washington standard22 and examines the cases that have developed Strick-
land's prejudice component.23 Next, the Note analyzes Fretwell's holding
that to establish prejudice, counsel's actions must have violated the defend-
ant's rights.24 The Note argues that this requirement represents the same
concern as Strickland's exclusion of "lawless decisionmakers."25 The Note
then evaluates the Court's use of hindsight to evaluate prejudice, arguing
that this practice represents a departure from Strickland.2 6 The Note con-
cludes that the use of hindsight undermines consistency in the evaluation of
13. Id. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 846-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 844.
16. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
17. Id. at 310.
18. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 852 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. See infra notes 58-81 and accompanying text. This Note primarily examines Fretvell's
holding on the prejudice component in claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; a thorough
analysis of the Court's retroactivity holding is beyond the scope of this Note. See infra notes 68-
72 and accompanying text for discussion of the Court's retroactivity holding, and see infra notes
182-91 and accompanying text for the history of this decision.
20. See infra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 114-38 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 139-56 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 157-81 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 182-99 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 199-226 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 227-46 and accompanying text.
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prejudicial error.27 Finally, the Note examines how lower federal courts
have applied Fretwell thus far.28
Sherman Sullins was shot and killed in his home during the course of a
robbery.29 Bobby Ray Fretwell confessed to the crime upon arrest3 and
admitted his guilt throughout his trial for felony robbery and murder.31 In
August of 1985, an Arkansas jury found Fretwell guilty of capital murder.32
At the sentencing phase,33 the prosecution relied on the evidence it
presented at trial and the court submitted two aggravating factors: first, that
the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, and second, that the murder
was committed to facilitate the defendant's escape.34
Seven months before Fretwell's sentencing hearing, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided Collins v. Lockhart.3 5 In
Collins, the court held that when the underlying capital crime is robbery and
felony murder, pecuniary gain-an element of the crime-may not serve as
an additional aggravating factor.36 Even though Collins was directly on
point in Fretwell's case, defense counsel apparently overlooked the law and
failed to object to the double submission of pecuniary gain as an aggravat-
ing factor.37
Having found the defendant guilty of robbery/murder, and absent a
Collins objection, the jury determined that Fretwell had committed the
crime for pecuniary gain.3 s However, it rejected the argument that Fretwell
27. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 247-74 and accompanying text.
29. Fretwell v. Lockhart, 739 F. Supp. 1334, 1335 (E.D. Ark. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
30. Id. Fretwell confessed twice, once to authorities in Wyoming where he was appre-
hended, and again to officials in Arkansas. Id.
31. Id. The trial court refused to accept a guilty plea based on the prosecutor's objection. Id.
Fretwell's trial counsel then decided that the best defense strategy would be to concede Fretwell's
culpability and appeal to the mercy of the jury. Id.
32. Id.
33. Arkansas has a bifurcated capital sentencing scheme in which the jury weighs aggravat-
ing circumstances against mitigating circumstances during a sentencing hearing. If the jury does
not find any aggravating circumstances, it must impose a sentence of life without parole. ARK.
CODs ANN. §§ 5-4-602 to -604 (Michie 1987).
34. 739 F. Supp. at 1335; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604 (Michie 1987) (enumerating
the aggravating factors).
35. 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985).
36. Id. at 263. Collins held that the practice of resubmitting an element of the crime as an
aggravating circumstance violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the procedure
did not sufficiently narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. Id. at 263-64.
According to the common law, pecuniary gain is an element of the offense of robbery felony
murder in Arkansas. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 605 S.W.2d 430,440 (Ark. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1035 (1981). For this reason, the Collins Court determined that it may not also serve as an
aggravating factor. Collins, 754 F.2d at 264.
37. Fretwell, 739 F. Supp. at 1337.
38. Id. at 1335.
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committed the murder to escape.39 Having found no mitigating factors in
the defendant's favor and basing its decision solely on the pecuniary gain
factor,4" the jury determined that Fretwell should receive the death
penalty.41
The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld Fretwell's conviction and death
sentence42 and later denied state post-conviction relief.4 3 Fretwell then
filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas claiming, among other things," that defense
counsel's failure to make the Collins objection constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.
45
In 1989, four years after Fretwell's sentencing hearing, the Eighth Cir-
cuit determined that the United States Supreme Court had overruled Col-
lins46 in Lowenfield v. Phelps,4 7 which declared that the practice of
"double-counting" aggravating circumstances does not violate the Eighth
Amendment.48 The Arkansas Supreme Court did not address the Collins
question until 1988, when it determined that Lowenfield validated the
"double-counting" of aggravating circumstances. 49
Notwithstanding Collins, the district court found that trial counsel's
ignorance of Collins was a "serious and significant error[ ]" constituting
deficient performance.5 Addressing Strickland's second prong, the court
stated that "[t]he prejudice to petitioner from counsel's error is obvious"
because, had counsel objected, the trial court would have most likely fol-
39. Id. at 1337.
40. Id. The defense submitted one mitigating factor to the jury-that Fretwell had a difficult
and disadvantaged childhood. Id. at 1335.
41. Id.
42. Fretwell v. State, 708 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Ark. 1986). The Arkansas Supreme Court did
not consider whether Fretwell was ineligible for the death penalty under Collins because counsel
had not objected at trial. Id. at 634.
43. Fretwell v. State, 728 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Ark. 1987). The court noted that the validity of
"double-counting" had never been litigated in Arkansas state courts; as a result, the court deter-
mined that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object because there is no duty to raise novel
issues. Id. at 181.
44. Fretwell also contended his defense counsel's strategy to admit culpability, his submis-
sion of an erroneous jury instruction, and his failure to call mitigation witnesses amounted to
ineffective assistance. Id. The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected these claims. Id. at 181-83.
45. Fretwell v. Lockhart, 739 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Ark. 1990), aftd, 946 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993). The district court applied the test described in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires a showing of deficient representation and preju-
dice. Fretwell, 739 F. Supp. at 1336-37.
46. Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1393 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
47. 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
48. Id. at 246.
49. O'Rourke v. State, 746 S.W.2d 52, 55-56 (Ark. 1988).
50. Fretvell, 739 F. Supp. at 1337. The court held that Fretwell's attorney provided deficient
representation because he violated the duty to be aware of all relevant capital sentencing law. Id.
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lowed Collins and not submitted pecuniary gain as an aggravating circum-
stance. 1 Given that the jury must find at least one aggravating
circumstance to impose the death penalty,52 and that the only aggravating
circumstance found by the jury was that the crime was committed for pecu-
niary gain, the court found that if Fretwell's counsel had made the proper
Collins objection, "the jury would have had no option but to sentence peti-
tioner to life imprisonment without parole."5 3 Fretwell established prejudi-
cial error by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, had counsel not
erred, the result of the proceeding would have been different.54 The State
of Arkansas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, which affirmed.5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari5 6 and reversed.5 7 The Court ad-
dressed whether Fretwell demonstrated prejudice under the standard an-
nounced in Strickland v. Washington." Traditionally, courts interpreted
Strickland's prejudice component as being met once a defendant demon-
strated a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceed-
ing's result would have been different.59 However, according to the
Fretwell Court, outcome-determination does not automatically establish
51. Id. The court noted that it was
confident that the trial court would have followed the ruling in Collins had trial counsel
made an appropriate motion. Although Collins has since been overruled, it was the law
in the Eighth Circuit at the time of petitioner's trial and this Court has no reason to
believe that the trial court would have chosen to disregard it.
Id.
In Snell v. Lockhart, 791 F. Supp. 1367 (E.D. Ark. 1992), the Court addressed the exact same
claim that Fretwell presented. Snell's attorney failed to object under Collins to the submission of
pecuniary gain as an aggravating circumstance. Id. at 1380. As in Fretwell, the district court
found that counsel's failure prejudiced the defendant, even though Collins had been subsequently
overruled. Id. at 1387-88.
52. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (Michie 1987).
53. Fretwell, 739 F. Supp. at 1337.
54. Id. The district court granted Fretwell relief based on counsel's failure to object and did
not address the remaining claims of ineffectiveness. Id. at 1337-38. The court vacated Fretwell's
death sentence and granted the State of Arkansas the right to conduct another sentencing hearing
within 90 days. Id. at 1338.
55. Fretwell v. Lockhart, 946 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993). The
parties conceded that counsel's performance was deficient, so the court of appeals only addressed
whether the defendant suffered prejudice. Id. at 574. The court of appeals affirmed by a divided
vote, with the majority adhering to an outcome-determinative test of prejudice. Id. at 578. The
dissenting judge asserted that no prejudice existed because of the lack of fundamental unfairness.
Id. at 578-79 (Luken, J., dissenting). Granting relief, the court of appeals ordered the district court
to reduce Fretwell's sentence unconditionally to life without parole to prevent further prejudice.
Id. at 578.
56. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 112 S. Ct. 1935 (1992).
57. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
58. Id. at 840.
59. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
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prejudicial error.60 Writing for the majority,6 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that the prejudice component of Strickland asks "whether counsel's
deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the pro-
ceeding fundamentally unfair."62 The Court added that "[u]nreliability or
unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive
the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the law enti-
tles him."6 3
The Court denied Fretwell relief, holding that his death sentence was
neither unfair nor unreliable.' The Court implied that because Collins was
subsequently overruled, Fretwell did not have a right to prevent the sub-
mission of pecuniary gain as an aggravating circumstance. 5 The Court rea-
soned that Fretwell did not have the right to the Collins objection; therefore,
defense counsel's ignorance of the law did not contribute to an unreliable
verdict establishing prejudice. 6 The Court further held that Strickland does
not require that prejudice be assessed from the time of the trial.67
The Court also announced that its holding does not violate the Teague
v. Lane68 rule against applying new rules of criminal procedure retroac-
tively in a way that favors the defendant.69 The Court explained that the
states' interests in comity and finality, rationales supporting Teague,7° are
not shared by criminal defendants. 7 ' A habeas defendant "has no interest in
the finality of. . . judgment[s]" nor any reliance interests comparable to
that of the states.72 According to the Court, these differences warrant dif-
60. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842.
61. Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter joined the majority opinion. Id. at 840.
Justices O'Connor and Thomas filed separate concurrences. Id. at 845-46. For a discussion of
Justice O'Connor's concurrence, see infra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
62. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844. The Court asserted that "[o]ur opinion does nothing more
than apply the case-by-case prejudice inquiry that has always been built into the Strickland test."
Id. at 843 n.2.
63. Id. at 844. For an analysis of the requirement that counsel's errors must deprive the
defendant of a right, see infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
64. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 843.
65. See infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
66. The Court declared that the only thing Fretwell was deprived of was "'the chance to have
the state court make an error in his favor."' Id. at 843 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae at 10, Fretwell (No. 91-1393)). Because the issue was not directly raised, the Court re-
fused to consider whether Collins remained good law in spite of the Court's decision in
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988). Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 843 n.4.
67. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844. For an analysis of the Court's use of hindsight to evaluate
prejudice, see infra notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
68. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
69. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844.
70. For the history and reasoning of Teague, see infra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
71. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844.
72. Id.
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ferential treatment such that "the State will benefit from our Teague deci-
sion in some federal habeas cases, while the habeas petitioner will not."73
Justice O'Connor agreed that defense counsel's performance did not
rise to the level of prejudicial error, but she objected to interpreting Strick-
land to reject outcome determination as the definitive standard of preju-
dice.74 In Justice O'Connor's view, Fretwell did not suffer prejudice
because courts should not recognize the effect of an objection that has be-
come moot under current law in their prejudice inquiry." She based this
conclusion on the fact that Strickland denies a defendant "the luck of a
lawless decisionmaker." 76
Justice Stevens, in dissent, rejected the notion that the subsequent fair-
ness or reliability of the result indicates the extent of prejudice suffered.77
Instead of focusing on the result, he insisted that the prejudice inquiry must
examine whether counsel's errors were serious enough to cause a break-
down in the adversarial process at trial.78 Justice Stevens contended that, if
the error is reasonably likely to have affected the outcome of the proceed-
ing, the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial.7 9 According to the dis-
sent, a separate inquiry into the fairness and reliability of the result "from
73. Id. The dissent argued, however, that applying laws retroactively to curtail the rights of
defendants, while not doing the same for the state, is inequitable and results in a windfall to the
state. Id. at 852-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In contrast, the majority contended that this policy
does not convey a windfall to the State and is a "perfectly logical limitation of Teague." Id. at
844.
74. Id. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She stated that "[t]he determinative question-
whether there is 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceed-
ing would have been different' . . . -remains unchanged." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). She added that "in the vast majority of
cases," the holding of Fretwell will not affect the prejudice determination. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
75. Id. at 845 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor claimed that Strickland pre-
cludes consideration of the effect of an objection that is "wholly meritless under current governing
law, even if the objection might have been considered meritorious at the time of its omission." Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
76. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a discussion of Strickland's exclusion of "lawless
decisionmakers," see infra notes 204-213 and accompanying text.
77. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 846-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined Justice
Steven's dissent. Id. at 846 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 847-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 847 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the Strickland standard is
"well-established" and clearly delineates the errors that constitute inadequate representation. Id.
at 848 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, when a defendant shows outcome determination, "the ad-
versary process has malfunctioned, and the resulting verdict is therefore, and without more, con-
stitutionally unacceptable." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also emphasized that
Fretwell clearly met the traditional Strickland test, id. at 850-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and that
under the circumstances of this case, the errors may have been so egregious as to warrant presum-
ing prejudice. Id. at 851 (Stevens, J.- dissenting).
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the vantage point of hindsight"' 0 is not only unnecessary, but actually rede-
fines the standard of prejudice that Strickland announced. 81
The right of a criminal defendant to the assistance of counsel is
grounded in both the express guarantee of the Sixth Amendment and the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. 2 Originally,
the right of counsel was intended only to grant a criminal defendant the
right to obtain and to have counsel present.8 3 It was not until 1932, in
Powell v. Alabama, 4 that the Supreme Court first recognized that due pro-
cess may require the appointment of counsel."5 This initial due process
right was limited to cases where the defendant could not provide for his
own defense because of "ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the
like."8 6
Ten years later, in Betts v. Brady, 7 the Court rejected the argument
that due process required counsel to be provided in every case.88 Instead, it
held that counsel will only be appointed when the circumstances indicate
that a deprivation would "constitute a denial of fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of justice."8 9 Thus, according to Betts, de-
fendants in state criminal proceedings did not have an absolute right, under
either the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
80. Id. at 849 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Arguing that Strickland requires prejudice to be de-
termined at the time of trial, rather than from the vantage point of hindsight, the dissent rejected
the Court's conclusion that the result of Fretwell's sentencing hearing was not unreliable in light
of subsequent law. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the appropriateness of a
hindsight inquiry, see infra notes 243-35 and accompanying text.
81. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 849 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that the hold-
ing represented an "unprincipled transformation of the standards governing ineffective assistance
claims, through the introduction of an element of hindsight that has no place in our Sixth Amend-
ment jurisprudence." Id. at 846 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also charged that the
majority incorrectly held that the right to effective assistance is premised on the protection of a
defendant's independent rights. Id. at 848-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed
that, by requiring a showing of fundamental unfairness, "the Court now demands that respondent
point to some additional indicia of unreliability, some specific way in which the breakdown of the
adversarial process affected respondent's discrete trial rights." Id. at 848 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
The Fifth Amendment states: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . U... U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]o State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV.
83. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65, 68 (1932).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 71.
86. Id.
87. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
88. Id. at 473.
89. Id. at 462.
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Amendment, to the appointment of counsel; instead, courts determined on a
case-by-case basis whether "fundamental fairness" warranted
appointment.90
Courts typically weighed the competing interests of the defendant and
the State to decide whether to provide counsel. Although the State had
interests in conserving resources, preserving verdicts, and maintaining the
integrity of its judicial system, the interests of the defendant were more
difficult to ascertain. Courts often measured the defendant's interest in ob-
taining counsel by the gravity and complexity of the charge91 and by the
age and education of the defendant.9" These factors proved difficult for
courts to identify at the outset of trial; as a result, appellate courts often
inquired into the actual harm or prejudice the defendant suffered as the
result of the denial of counsel.93
Until 1963, "fundamental fairness" remained the test for a state de-
fendant's right to counsel.94 In that year the Supreme Court overruled Betts
in Gideon v. Wainwright.95 In Gideon, the Court held that the right to coun-
sel was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial.96 Lower courts would
no longer have to examine, on a case-by-case basis, the extent to which
fairness dictated the need for counsel. The Court's desire to extend to state
defendants the same Sixth Amendment protection that existed at the federal
level motivated this per se rule that a denial of counsel violated due
process.97
Thus, in Gideon, the Court incorporated the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel as a necessary component of the due process right to a
fair trial. Since then, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been re-
garded as a procedural right, designed to protect the other substantive and
procedural rights afforded the accused.9" The Sixth Amendment envisions
90. Id.
91. Courts generally hold that a defendant's interest in life in a capital case is sufficient to
require the appointment of counsel. See, e.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955).
92. See Bruce A. Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 1052, 1055 (1980).
93. See id. at 1055. The author states that "the due process inquiry eventually shifted to
whether 'the disadvantage from absence of counsel [was] ... aggravated by circumstances show-
ing that it resulted in the prisoner actually being taken advantage of, or prejudiced."' Id. (quoting
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739 (1948)).
94. In 1938, the Supreme Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to all felony
defendants in federal courts. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
95. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
96. Id. at 343-45.
97. See Green, supra note 92, at 1055.
98. See Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. Rv.
1259, 1268-69 (1988); Green, supra note 92, at 1056.
1994] 1377
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
counsel as an active advocate of her client's cause99 whose vigorous repre-
sentation is necessary to ensure that the adversarial system functions prop-
erly. The fundamental role of counsel as an effective advocate was the
foundation for both the Court's conclusion in Gideon and its later view that
the right to counsel implies a right to the effective assistance of counsel. 10
The Supreme Court has declared that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is a right to "effective" counsel. 10 1 In its early interpretation of the
right to "effective counsel," the Supreme Court loosely referred to the con-
cept and provided few criteria for lower courts to assess inadequate repre-
sentation. The Court first suggested that counsel must perform
"effectively" in Powell v. Alabama, °2 in which the trial court did not ap-
point the defendant's counsel until the day of trial, leaving little time to
prepare a defense.103 The Court specifically noted that a denial of "an ef-
fective appointment of counsel" violates due process. 1°4 The Court ex-
pounded on this initial pronouncement in Avery v. Alabama,105 stating that
the right to counsel "cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment" and
may be violated where counsel is denied the opportunity "to confer, to con-
sult with the accused and to prepare his defense."' 6 Shortly thereafter, the
Court held that an attorney's actual conflict of interest may render represen-
tation ineffective. 07
Due process formed the exclusive basis of the early entitlement to the
effective assistance of counsel, as courts decided if counsel was appointed
in a manner that precluded effective representation. °" When the Court re-
turned to the more exacting Sixth Amendment inquiry of Gideon, it laid the
foundation for a declaration of a specific Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive counsel. 109 The Court stood virtually silent, however, until 1970, when
99. See Gabriel, supra note 98, at 1270 ("For the adversary system to work properly, a de-
fendant's lawyer must exhibit 'entire devotion,' 'warm zeal,' and the 'utmost learning' in her
client's cause." (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILrrY Canon 15 (1980))).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 148-50, 244.
101. For a general history of the right to effective counsel, see Robert J. Conflitti, Note, A New
Focus on Prejudice in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases: The Assertion of Rights Standard,
21 AMER. CPm. L. Rsv. 29, 29-32 (1983); Helen Gredd, Comment, Washington v. Strickland:
Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1544, 1549-
50 (1983); Green, supra note 92, at 1057-73; Richard P. Rhodes, Note, Strickland v. Washington:
Protection of the Capital Defendant's Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel?, 12 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 121 passim (1992).
102. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
103. Id. at 71.
104. Id. The Court further stated that a court cannot discharge its duty by appointing counsel
in a manner that precludes effective assistance. Id.
105. 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940).
106. Id.
107. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942).
108. See supra notes 82-107 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
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it announced in McMann v. Richardson"' that "the right to counsel is the
right to the effective assistance of counsel." 1 ' The McMann Court pro-
vided little substantive guidance, except to establish that a defendant could
challenge counsel's performance if it fell below "the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." ' 2 The Court left to the lower
courts the task of defining the minimum level of competence the Constitu-
tion requires.' 13
Before Strickland, courts took various approaches to prejudice. State
and lower federal courts had recognized the right to effective assistance
prior to McMann" 4 and had developed a wide variety of tests to evaluate
the claims." 5 Initially, courts held that an attorney's ineffectiveness must
violate the "fundamental fairness" of the proceeding. 16 This pure due pro-
cess approach evolved into the "farce and mockery" test, whereby a defend-
ant had to demonstrate that counsel's errors rendered "the proceeding[ ] ...
a farce and a mockery of justice.""' 7 The "farce and mockery" standard
focused on the overall fairness of the proceeding, without regard to the spe-
cific instances of attorney misconduct." 8 A defendant not only had to
prove affirmative harm, but also had to meet the much heavier burden of
showing that counsel's performance adversely affected the entire nature of
the proceeding. 19
Early cases held that counsel's errors must have been so egregious that
they implicated the court in the failure to protect the defendant. 2 ° How-
ever, later decisions indicated that the "farce and mockery" test was merely
110. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
Ill. Id. at 771.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. For a decision that recognized an ineffective assistance claim long before McMann, see
State v. Gunter, 30 La. Ann. 536, 549 (1878); see also Gredd, supra note 101, at 1550 (noting that
early recognition of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was a rare use of a court's supervi-
sory powers).
115. For a complete account of the test that the lower federal courts used prior to Strickland,
see Rhodes, supra note 101, at 124-35.
116. E.g., Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108, 111 (7th Cir. 1957); Annotation, Incompetency,
Negligence, Illness or the Like of Counsel as a Ground for New Trial or Reversal in Criminal
Case, 24 A.L.R. 1025, 1025-31 (1923).
117. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). The
"farce and mockery" test emerged as the dominant test in the federal circuits. See J. Gregory
Mermelstein, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: Towards a Uniform Framework for
Review, 50 Mo. L. REv. 651, 656 (1985). For a list of state courts that adopted the standard, see
Green, supra note 92, at 1058 n.41.
118. See Green, supra note 92, at 1059.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376,379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
950 (1950) ("The proof of the efficiency of such assistance lies in the character of the resultant
proceedings ....").
120. United States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 187-88 (2d Cir. 1980).
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a metaphor for the heavy burden that a defendant faced in proving a viola-
tion of due process. 121 In a more recent application of the "farce and mock-
ery" standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
stated that a conviction would not be reversed "unless [counsel's perform-
ance] prevented [the defendant] from receiving a fair trial." 122
Courts and commentators sharply criticized the "farce and mockery"
standard.' 3 They charged that the test failed to promote the procedural
interests of the Sixth Amendment, 24 was too vague to be administered uni-
formly, 12 and imposed an undue burden upon defendants.126 By overrul-
ing the analogous "fundamental fairness... shocking to the universal sense
of justice" standard in Gideon v. Wainwright,2" the Supreme Court has-
tened the demise of the "farce and mockery" analysis.' 28
Various tests focusing on the "reasonableness" of counsel's actions re-
placed the vague "farce and mockery" analysis. 129 In addition to showing
that specific errors by counsel were "unreasonable," most courts required
that the defendant demonstrate affirmative harm resulting from the attor-
ney's poor performance. 130 Some courts conducted a harmless error analy-
sis while others required the defendant affirmatively to establish
prejudice.' 3 ' This early element of prejudice took many forms, ranging
121. See, e.g., McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974).
122. United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1970). The court in Katz refused to
find ineffective assistance when the defense attorney slept through testimony. Id. It determined
that the defendant did in fact receive a fair trial because counsel's failures had not altered the
nature of the proceeding. Id.
123. See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1,
28 (1973). Every federal circuit court of appeals rejected the "farce and mockery" test, except for
the Second Circuit, which retained the test until 1983. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d
149, 154 (2d Cir. 1983); Conflitti, supra note 101, at 33.
124. See Green, supra note 92, at 1059.
125. See Mermelstein, supra note 117, at 656.
126. See Conflitti, supra note 101, at 34-35; Mermelstein, supra note 11 , at 657.
127. 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
128. See, e.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 542 (rejecting the "farce and mockery"
analysis in light of Gideon), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
129. For the various approaches to the "reasonableness" standard, see Rhodes, supra note 101,
at 129-35.
130. The origin of this requirement of prejudice is unclear. The Court has rejected an affirma-
tive showing of harm, or even a harmless error analysis, in certain categories of effective assist-
ance cases. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (refusing to require a showing
of prejudice for overturning trial court's refusal to let an attorney consult with his client over-
night). Some commentators suggest that courts may have adopted this initial requirement of prej-
udice through a misreading of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54 (1970), in which the
Supreme Court stated that a belated appointment of counsel had not resulted in prejudice to the
defendant. See, e.g., Green, supra note 92, at 1064-65 (finding it unlikely that the Supreme Court
intended to require an element of prejudice in Chambers).
131. See Green, supra note 92, at 1062. Some courts used different variants of the harmless
error test to determine prejudice. The Third Circuit required the defendant to demonstrate unrea-
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from simply requiring that the error be relevant to the outcome of the pro-
ceeding,132 to reversing only if an attorney's inadequate performance under-
mined the factual reliability of the result.133  Most courts, however,
employed a materiality standard that weighed the gravity of the error
against all admissible evidence to determine if it adversely affected the
outcome. 134
For a certain limited category of ineffectiveness claims, a defendant
has never been required to show actual harm. In cases when state action
denies effective assistance 135 or when the attorney operates under a conflict
of interest, 136 the Supreme Court has declared that prejudice is so likely to
result that reversal is automatic. 137 In the context of attorney errors, how-
ever, courts have consistently required a showing of prejudice, either as an
element of the claim or under a harmless error analysis.'
38
Fourteen years after McMann, in its review of an Eleventh Circuit
case,' 39 the Supreme Court dispensed with the various lower court ap-
proaches and announced a national standard to govern claims of ineffective-
ness. The defendant in Strickland v. Washington 4 ° asserted that his
appointed counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at
sonable performance was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, while the Fourth Circuit placed
the burden on the government to establish lack of harm. See Conflitti, supra note 101, at 37.
132. See, e.g., Garton v. Swenson, 417 F. Supp. 697, 704 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
133. See Harvey E. Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Depar-
tures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. Rv. 927, 962 (1973) (advocating the position that a de-
fendant must establish a claim of innocence before habeas relief is warranted for ineffective
assistance of counsel).
134. See Green, supra note 92, at 1061. Jurisdictions required varying degrees-including a
simple probability, a reasonable probability, or a near certainty-of the error's effect upon the
outcome. For a discussion of materiality, see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-07 (1976).
135. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 82 (1976) (trial court ordered counsel not
to confer overnight with his client); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 856 (1975) (state statute
making closing statement by defense counsel discretionary held to have denied due process);
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 52-53 (1961) (counsel denied at arraignment).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-61 (1984); Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
137. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60; Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489 ("When a defendant is de-
prived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or during a
critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic."); Glasser, 315
U.S. at 76 ("[T]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow
courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.").
138. See Green, supra note 92, at 1065. The author contended that an affirmative showing of
prejudice may have arisen because courts continued to adhere to a due process analysis after
McMann. Id. Considering claims of due process violations often require a showing of actual
harm, the author suggested that the courts analogized claims of ineffective assistance to other due
process violations. Id.
139. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd, Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
140. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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his capital sentencing hearing amounted to ineffective assistance. 141 The
federal district court concluded that the errors were unreasonable, yet harm-
less. 142 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed the decision but modified the test to require a showing of actual and
substantial prejudice as an element of the claim. 143
The Supreme Court upheld the two-prong test, declaring that a defend-
ant must prove deficient performance and prejudice to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.'" Prejudice exists, according to Strick-
land, when the errors are "so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable."' 45 The Court further stated that the
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that "but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent."' 4 6 A reasonable probability that the outcome would have been differ-
ent exists when there is a "sufficient" probability that the deficient
performance undermined the reliability of the result. 47
The Strickland Court repeatedly emphasized that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to the effective assistance of counsel protects a defendant's fun-
damental right to a fair trial.' 48 The Court defined a fair trial as one in
which evidence is presented subject to sufficient "adversarial testing."' 49
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor explained that "[t]he bench-
mark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."' 5 ° Thus,
prejudice results when there has been a breakdown in the adversarial pro-
cess as the result of counsel's poor performance.
141. Id. at 675-76.
142. Id. at 678-79.
143. Id. at 680-83.
144. Id. at 687. Under the first prong, an attorney is deficient when she does not function as
counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Id. The Court developed a more concrete test requiring that
a defendant show the attorney's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
... under prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688. Review must be "highly deferential," and
the court must evaluate the reasonableness of counsel's performance at the time of trial, not with
the benefit of the "distorting effects of hindsight." Id. at 689-90.
145. Id. at 687.
146. Id. at 694.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 684, 687, 689, 696.
149. Id. at 685.
150. Id. at 686; see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (holding that the "bench-
mark" of the right to counsel under Strickland is the "fairness of the adversary proceeding");
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (stating that the right to effective assistance
exists "because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial"); U.S. v.
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (noting that the constitutional right to effective assistance is
grounded in protecting the adversary system).
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In adopting the "reasonable likelihood" standard of prejudice, 15 1 the
Court rejected both a more stringent standard requiring proof that the errors
"more likely than not" affected the outcome, and a lesser test that would
deem prejudicial all errors that could have conceivably influenced the result
or impaired the defense.' 52 The Court reasoned that neither of these alter-
natives would consistently assess the extent to which the attorney's per-
formance contributed to an unreliable result.' 53
The Court qualified the outcome-determination definition of prejudice
by excluding certain considerations from its assessment. When evaluating
the likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant, a court should
not account for the "idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker," nor
consider the possibility of "arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, 'nullification,'
and the like."' 151 The Court reasoned that accounting for these factors,
would give the defendant the benefit of "the luck of a lawless deci-
sionmaker [who fails to] reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially ap-
ply[ ] the standards that govern the decision."'155
Strickland's prejudice component did not alter most lower federal
courts' formulations of ineffective assistance. By this time, all the circuit
courts had abandoned the "farce and mockery" test and adopted a two-
tiered analysis requiring that a defendant prove both deficient performance
and prejudice.' 56 The significance of Strickland was its announcement that
a defendant need only establish a reasonable probability that counsel's er-
rors adversely affected the outcome. Thus, the Strickland Court articulated
a national standard that would be applied uniformly to all habeas petitioners
seeking relief from inadequate performance by defense counsel.
Nix v. Whiteside 57 presented the Court with its first test of the preju-
dice component after Strickland. The defendant in Nix wanted to testify
falsely at trial to strengthen his claim of self-defense.' 58 Knowing such
testimony would be false, defense counsel warned his client that he would
have an ethical duty to inform the court of the perjury and would seek to
151. The Court noted that the "reasonable probability" test comes from the materiality stan-
dard used as the test for exculpatory information not disclosed and testimony prevented by gov-
ernment deportation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
152. Id. at 693-94.
153. Id. at 694.
154. Id. at 695.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 697.
157. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
158. Id. at 160-61. The defendant consistently stated before trial that although he had not seen
a gun in his victim's hand, he shot in self-defense. Id. About a week before trial, the defendant
changed his story to state that he had seen his victim holding a gun. Id. Counsel advised him that
only a reasonable belief was necessary to establish self-defense, but apparently, the defendant felt
he needed to perjure himself to convince the jury that he had acted in self-defense. Id.
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withdraw from the case.159 The defendant did not present the perjured testi-
mony, and the jury returned a verdict of second-degree murder.1 60
Although the Supreme Court focused primarily on the reasonableness
of counsel's course of action, 1' it held, as a matter of law, that the failure
to assist in the presentation of perjured testimony could not constitute preju-
dicial error.'6 2 Rejecting the argument that counsel acted under a conflict
of interest,' the Court refused to let a defendant claim that an attorney's
failure to cooperate in a plan of perjury undermined the reliability of the
verdict." 4 The Court stressed that under Strickland, a defendant is not enti-
tled to the "'luck of a lawless decisionmaker.' ,1"65 Justice Blackmun, in his
concurring opinion, added that acquittals based on perjury are fundamen-
tally unfair and that a defendant does not have a right to present perjured
testimony. 166 He asserted that prejudice can exist only when a defendant is
deprived of a fair trial or a "specific constitutional right designed to guaran-
tee a fair trial." 67
During the same term, in Kimmelman v. Morrison,6 1 the Court ad-
dressed whether a Fourth Amendment claim, when barred from federal
habeas review, can form the basis of an ineffective assistance claim.' 6 9 The
Court held that it can.' 70 The Court also examined whether counsel's fail-
ure to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained without a search warrant
constituted ineffective assistance, 17 ' although neither party had presented
such a claim. 172
159. Id. at 161.
160. Id. at 161-62.
161. Id. at 165-75. The Court concluded that counsel's exposition of the perjury was reason-
able and that counsel's duty of loyalty only extended to legal acts. Id. at 174.
162. Id. at 175.
163. Id. at 176. The lower court held that counsel acted subject to a conflict of interest be-
cause the threat to reveal the perjury constituted a breach of the duty of confidence and loyalty.
Id. at 163. The Supreme Court determined that the defendant's desire did create a conflict, but it
was "not remotely the kind of conflict of interests dealt with in Cuyler v. Sullivan." Id. at 176
(citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)).
164. Id. at 175.
165. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)). For an analysis of the
holding of Nix, see infra text accompanying notes 200-07, 217.
166. Nix 475 U.S. at 185-86 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 186-87 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
168. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
169. Id. at 373-83. This issue arises because Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), bars
Fourth Amendment claims on habeas review when the state provided the defendant a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the claim below. Kimnelman, 477 U.S. at 486.
170. Kimnmelman, 477 U.S. at 382-83.
171. Id. at 374-75.
172. Id. at 383. Because the parties did not raise the claim directly, all discussion of whether
counsel's performance constituted ineffective assistance amounts to dicta.
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All members of the Court agreed that defense counsel's omission con-
stituted unreasonable and deficient representation under Strickland's first
prong. 73 The justices divided six to three, however, on the proper standard
of prejudice under Strickland. The majority adhered to the outcome-deter-
mination test and held that relief would be warranted if the defendant could
establish a reasonable probability that counsel's omission affected the out-
come. 74 The concurring opinion, written by Justice Powell and joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, argued that Strickland does not
establish outcome determination as the controlling test. 7 5 Instead, Justice
Powell asserted that a court must ask whether the attorney's error rendered
the proceeding unfair or the result unreliable' 76 and that Strickland
"strongly suggests that only errors that call into question the basic justice of
the defendant's conviction suffice to establish prejudice."177 Justice Powell
concluded that "fundamental fairness" could not be violated in this case
because the illegally obtained evidence that the attorney failed to suppress
reliably indicated the defendant's guilt.'78 Thus, the concurring opinion in
Kimmelman suggests that a defendant must prove that counsel's errors un-
dermined the factual reliability of the verdict or sentence to establish preju-
dice under Strickland.179
A survey of state and lower federal courts reveals that courts have
consistently, if not exclusively, interpreted Strickland as holding that preju-
dice exists when a defendant demonstrates a reasonable probability that
counsel's errors adversely affected the outcome of the proceeding.1
80
173. Id. at 389-90; id. at 394 (Powell, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 389-91.
175. Id. at 394-95 (Powell, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 391-97 (Powell, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 395 (Powell, J., concurring). Quoting Strickland, Justice Powell explained:
A court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechani-
cal rules. Although those principles should guide the process of decision, the ultimate
focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is
being challenged. In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the
strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable
because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce
just results.
Id. (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984)) (empha-
sis added).
178. Id. at 394, 396-97 (Powell, J., concurring).
179. See infra text accompanying notes 243-46 for a comparison of Justice Powell's view
with Fretwell.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1419 (2nd Cir. 1993); Ward v.
United States, 995 F.2d 1317, 1321 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Peak, 992 F.2d 39, 41 (4th
Cir. 1993); Carson v. Collins, 993 F.2d 461, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1993); Haislip v. Attorney General,
992 F.2d 1085, 1087 (10th Cir. 1993); Linnen v. Armanis, 991 F.2d 1102, 1106 (3d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Harley, 990 F.2d 1340, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Garfield, 987 F.2d
1424, 1427 (9th Cir. 1993); Laird v. United States, 987 F.2d 527, 529 (8th Cir. 1993); Lema v.
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Strickland's language of fairness and reliability has appeared in many deci-
sions, but no court prior to Fretwell justified its holding solely on the basis
of the overall fairness or reliability of the result, without regard to outcome
determination.' 8' The Supreme Court did not address the potential tension
between the two standards until its decision in Fretwell.
In addition to its determination that no prejudice existed in Fretwell,z82
the Court held that "new rules" of constitutional criminal procedure that cut
back the rights of criminal defendants can be applied retroactively. In 1989,
a plurality of the Supreme Court held in Teague v. Lane183 that, subject to
two exceptions,' 84 habeas petitioners may not seek the benefit of a "new
rule" of law announced after petitioner's conviction or sentence became
final.' 85 The Teague non-retroactivity doctrine serves to protect the finality
interests of the states'86 and recognizes that a state should not be penalized
for relying on the standards that prevailed at the original proceeding.'87
United States, 987 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1993); Yech v. Goodwin, 985 F.2d 538, 540 (11th Cir.
1993); United States v. Sanchez, 984 F.2d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 1993).
181. See, e.g., Henderson v. Dugger, 925 F.2d 1309, 1320 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that fail-
ure to appeal trial court instruction to the jury may have constituted inadequate representation, but
that no prejudice was established because the error did not cause the unfair outcome); United
States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1990) (failing to find ineffective assistance but
asserting that the right only guarantees fair representation, not perfect performance); Bertolotti v.
Dugger, 883 F.2d 1503, 1510 (1 Ith Cir. 1989) (finding adequate representation but stating that the
focus should be on the fundamental fairness of the proceedings).
182. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
183. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
184. Teague provided that a "new rule" that places "certain kinds of primary, private individ-
ual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe" will be applied
retroactively. Id. at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); accord Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 329 (1989). Second, a rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of
"those procedures that ... are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' Teague, 489 U.S. at
307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693).
185. See generally John Blume & William Pratt, Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANri. 325 (1991) (arguing that the Teague Court's attempt to modify retroac-
tivity doctrine was largely unsuccessful); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law,
Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. Rv. 1731, 1736 (1991) (arguing
for reform in constitutional new law doctrines); Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HAsmi Os
LJ. 941, 958-1001 (1991) (examining retroactivity doctrine in context with the historical develop-
ment of habeas corpus doctrine); Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CmRINUOLOGY 9, 19-27 (1990) (arguing that Teague initiated the Court's campaign to restrict the
writ of habeas corpus); Karl N. Metzner, Note, Retroactivity, Habeas Corpus, and the Death
Penalty: An Unholy Alliance, 41 DuiJ LJ. 160, 182-90 (1991) (arguing for modification of
retroactivity doctrine).
186. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308-09. The Court stated: "Application of constitutional rules not in
existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality
essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is
deprived of much of its deterrent effect." Id. at 309.
187. Id. at 306.
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Prior to Fretwell, the Supreme Court did not address the application of
Teague's non-retroactivity principle to "new rules" that constrict-rather
than expand-the rights of criminal defendants and habeas petitioners.1 88
For the most part, the few circuit court decisions that had addressed the
question determined that Teague applied and prevented retroactive applica-
tion.1 89 Before Fretwell, Professor Liebman had suggested that Teague's
policy of treating like litigants alike' 90 dictates that decisions which restrict
the rights of habeas defendants not be applied retroactively.' 91 Further-
more, he argued:
Any other approach would even further erode habeas corpus' de-
terrent policy because it would increase the 'incentive' on the part
of state courts to ignore existing constitutional law based on the
probability that some part of that law will be cut back by the
increasingly large and cohesive conservative majority of the
Supreme Court.'
92
188. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 422 n.4 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asking
whether the Court intended to apply Teague when decisions cut back rights).
189. See Andiarena v. United States, 967 F.2d 715, 717 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding that the more
rigorous cause and prejudice standard announced in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493
(1991), did not constitute a "new rule" under Teague, and thus could be applied retroactively),
denial ofpost-conviction relief aff'd by 7 F.3d 218 (1st Cir. 1993); Williams v. Withrow, 944 F.2d
284, 290 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding that the harmless error rule of Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S.
279, 295-96 (1991), should be applied retroactively because it created a 'new rule' and fits within
Teague's second exception), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993); Church v.
Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1517 n.13 (10th Cir. 1991) (dicta) ("Mhe Fulminante harmless error
rule does not apply retroactively to collateral review cases because it creates a 'new rule' within
the meaning of Teague v. Lane ... and does not fit within any of the Teague exceptions."); Harris
v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1512 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding thatrule proposed by prisoner could not
be applied retroactively to his case because it was a "new rule" under Teague), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1275 (1992). But see Andriarena, 967 F.2d at 717 n.3 (listing cases in which courts have
retroactively applied law without a Teague inquiry).
The dissent in Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d at 1542 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), argued that the
Teague analysis is inappropriate when the question is whether to restrict, rather than expand, the
rights of the defendant. Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Instead of relying on Teague, the dissent
suggested an alternative analysis in which the court should first inquire whether a defendant rea-
sonably relied upon the old rule and then ask whether applying the new rule retroactively would
be inequitable. Id. at 1542-43 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
In rights-contracting cases, it is the defendant's reliance on the old rule that is impli-
cated. The defendant's reliance cannot, of course, be equated with an interest in main-
mining the finality of his conviction; habeas petitioners by definition are attacking that
very finality. Thus, the application of the Teague standard to rights-contracting deci-
sions borders on the irrational or absurd.
Id. at 1543 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
190. Teague, 489 U.S. at 303-05 (plurality opinion) ("[H]arm caused by the failure to treat
similarly situated defendants alike cannot be exaggerated").
191. JmaMs S. LEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PiRCC AND PROcEDtRE 234 (Supp.
1992).
192. Id.
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The Court in Fretwell, however, did not consider any countervailing poli-
cies against applying restrictive law retroactively against a habeas peti-
tioner's interest.
Fretwell directs courts, when evaluating prejudice in ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claims, to examine whether counsel's deficient performance
rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair or led to an unreliable re-
sult.193 To the extent that Fretwell declares fundamental fairness to be the
guide in ineffectiveness claims, it merely restates precedent. From the time
the Court recognized the right to counsel in Powell v. Alabama,194 the pur-
pose of the right has been to ensure that a criminal defendant receives a fair
trial; only attorney errors that render the proceeding unfair or the result
unreliable suffice to establish prejudice.1 95
Strickland established that attorney errors rise to this level when coun-
sel's representation is deficient and "there is a reasonable probability that,
but for [the unreasonable performance], the result of the proceeding would
have been different." '196 Fretwell declares, however, that "an analysis fo-
cussing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether
the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is de-
fective."'197 This statement should not be interpreted as rejecting outcome
determination as a valid measure of unfairness and unreliability, nor should
Fretwell be read as removing the defendant's burden to establish outcome
determination. Fretwell merely addresses a limited question, one that the
Strickland Court apparently never considered-whether a defendant can
claim prejudice from counsel's failure to invoke a law that is no longer
valid. For most cases, outcome determination remains the definitive test of
prejudicial error.198
Only when a defendant is unable to demonstrate that counsel's errors
deprived him of a substantive or procedural right will Fretwell apply.
193. Frenvell, 113 S. Ct. at 842.
194. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
195. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) ('The essence of an ineffective-
assistance claim is that counsel's unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial balance between
defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect."); Nix
v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (stating that the "benchmark" of the right to effective
counsel is to protect the "fairness of the adversary process"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (holding that prejudice exists when "counsel's errors were so serious as to de-
prive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable"); United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 658 (1984) ("Absent some effect of challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial
process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated."); United States v. Morrison,
449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (stating that the right to counsel "is meant to assure fairness in the
adversary criminal process").
196. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
197. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842.
198. Id. at 845 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also infra notes 250-74 and accompanying text
(discussing lower court decisions applying Fretwell).
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Although Strickland does not explicitly provide for this foundational re-
quirement, the Court asserted that its "rights requirement" serves to clarify,
rather than alter, the Strickland analysis. 199 The Strickland Court also con-
tended that this interpretation of Strickland was not a new one, but that the
decision of Nix v. Whiteside2" employed the same reasoning.20'
In his concurring opinion in Nix, Justice Blackmun noted that a de-
fendant does not have a right to testify falsely and that by claiming coun-
sel's obstruction of a plan of perjury prejudiced his interests, the defendant
"claims a right the law simply does not recognize." 202 Fretwell interpreted
Nix as holding that because a defendant does not have the right to present
perjured testimony, counsel's actions to prevent false testimony cannot es-
tablish prejudice.20 3 Thus, Justice Blackmun's reasoning supports Fretwell.
The Nix Court appears, however, to have based its holding on the fact that a
defendant is "not entitled to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker" under
Strickland.2°  Both opinions in Nix emphasized this prohibition and the
Court implied that a jury acting under the influence of perjury would in fact
be a "lawless decisionmaker" within the meaning of Strickland.°5 In
Fretwell, both Justices O'Connor and Stevens concluded that Nix relied on
this aspect of Strickland.20 6 Justice Stevens argued that perjury represents a
"paradigmatic example of the 'lawlessness' to which Strickland
referred. '20 7
Excluding "lawless decisionmakers" from the prejudice inquiry ap-
pears to have two purposes. First, this entire passage in Strickland suggests
that courts must evaluate prejudice objectively, without accounting for the
"idiosyncracies of the particular decisionmaker, such as unusual propensi-
ties toward harshness or leniency."208 A defendant may not claim that the
particular sentencing practices of a judge or the idiosyncratic decisionmak-
ing process of the jury would have led to a more favorable outcome.20 9
Instead, the court must proceed on the assumption that the judge or jury
"reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially appl[ied] the standards that
govern[ed] the decision. 2 0
199. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842 n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
201. Id. at 183.
202. Id. at 186 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
203. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 843.
204. Id. at 175; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
205. Nix, 475 U.S. at 175; id. at 186 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
206. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 845 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 850 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 850 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694-95 (1984).
209. Id. at 695.
210. Id.
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As well as establishing an objective inquiry, this aspect of Strickland
sought to preclude the defendant from claiming prejudice in situations
where there is no possibility that counsel's errors contributed to an unrelia-
ble result. Reliability and fairness are the touchstones of the prejudice in-
quiry; a judge or jury that does not "act[ ] according to the law""I and
apply "the standards that govern the decision"212 can never produce an ac-
curate, reliable outcome. Therefore, a defendant may not claim that his
defense was prejudiced by attorney errors that prevent the decisionmaker
from acting "lawlessly." When examined in this light, Nix is a perfect ex-
ample of this concern: Perjury cannot contribute to a more reliable, accu-
rate outcome, so a defendant may not claim prejudice from an attorney's
failure to promote false testimony.213
Fretwell makes this same point with its "rights requirement"-attor-
ney errors that do not deprive the defendant of a right cannot contribute to
an unreliable outcome.214 In this situation, the reliability of the result is
determined without reference to the possible outcome-determinative effects
of counsel's errors.215 Thus, the reasoning behind Fretwell's "rights re-
quirement" is exactly the same as Strickland's exclusion of "lawless deci-
sionmakers." 16 The Court in Fretwell easily could have declared that if the
decisionmaker gives the defendant the benefit of a right to which he is not
entitled, it acts "lawlessly" under the meaning of Strickland. Justice Black-
mun, in his concurring opinion in Nix, appears to have done just that by
asserting both that a defendant does not have a right to present perjured
testimony and that such testimony cannot contribute to a reliable out-
come.2" 7 The Court in Fretwell did not expressly equate the two concepts,
and it apparently did not intend to hold that Fretwell claimed the "luck of a
lawless decisionmaker."
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, insisted that Fretwell was
impermissibly claiming the "luck of a lawless decisionmaker" by "advocat-
ing a decidedly incorrect point of law."21 Under the plain meaning of the
phrase, Fretwell certainly would be claiming the "luck of a lawless deci-
sionmaker" if, at the time of his sentencing hearing, state law expressly
permitted pecuniary gain to be both an element of robbery/murder and an
211. Id. at 694.
212. Id. at 695.
213. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175-76 (1986) (stating that the defendant "has no valid
claim that confidence in the result of his trial has been diminished by his desisting from the
contemplated perjury").
214. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842-43.
215. Id. at 844.
216. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
217. Nix, 475 U.S. at 185-87 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
218. Fretvell, 113 S. Ct. at 845 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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aggravating circumstance. Fretwell would be asking the jury to violate "the
standards that govern the decision"2 9 to return a more favorable sentence.
This was not the situation in August of 1985, when the sentencing jury
convened to determine Fretwell's punishment. The Eighth Circuit had pro-
hibited the "double-counting" of aggravating factors in Collins seven
months earlier,2"° and no Arkansas state court had considered the issue.22
The Arkansas Supreme Court did not address the Collins question until
1988, two years after Fretwell's conviction became final on direct ap-
peal.222 In fact, Fretwell was the first defendant to claim in the state
supreme court that "double-counting" rendered him ineligible for the death
penalty.223 Therefore, because no Arkansas law existed on the issue at the
time of Fretwell's sentencing hearing, the jury would not have been acting
"lawlessly" had the trial court sustained an objection under Collins and pre-
vented pecuniary gain from serving as an aggravating circumstance.
Justice O'Connor concluded that even if the decision would have been
proper at the time, a subsequent change in the law can render it "law-
less."2 24 Strickland does not appear to support this expansive interpretation
of the prohibition against "lawless decisionmakers." By declaring that a
jury is "lawless" if it fails to apply the "standards which govern the deci-
sion,"2" the Strickland Court focused on the time of the proceeding and
defined a "lawless decisionmaker" as one who fails to apply the existing
law.226
Perhaps realizing that the "lawlessness" aspect of Strickland would not
support a hindsight inquiry, the Fretwell Court announced a similar "rights
requirement" and concluded that courts may evaluate the scope of a defend-
ant's fights under current law.227 The Court held that under Collins,
Fretwell was not entitled to prevent the "double-counting" of aggravating
circumstances. 228 The Court stated that "it was the premise of our grant in
this case that Perry was correctly decided, i.e., that respondent was not
entitled to an objection based on 'double counting.' 229 To reach this con-
clusion, the Court either determined that Fretwell did not have the fight at
the time of his sentencing hearing or that, even if he did, any fight at trial
was extinguished because Collins was no longer good law.
219. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
220. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 41, 46-47 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
223. See Fretwell v. State, 708 S.W.2d 630, 634 (Ark. 1986).
224. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 845 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
225. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (emphasis added).
226. Id. at 694-95.
227. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 843.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 844.
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Although the Arkansas state court was not obligated to follow the
Eighth Circuit precedent of Collins230 had counsel invoked it, nothing pre-
vented the trial court from applying it because no state precedent existed. 231
In its review of Fretwell's habeas corpus petition, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas noted that it was confident that
the trial court would have followed Collins.232 The Fretwell Court appears
to suggest that because Collins was "correctly" overruled, Fretwell did not
have a right to utilize its reasoning at that time. However, because the court
could have applied Collins without violating precedent, it would be difficult
to suggest that Fretwell did not have a right to the Collins objection at the
time of his sentencing hearing.
Therefore, the Court most likely used hindsight to determine that
Fretwell did not have a right to the Collins objections. In fact, the Court
specifically held that Strickland does not prohibit the use of hindsight when
evaluating prejudice; only Strickland's first prong-the reasonableness of
counsel's actions-is limited to the time of trial.233 Strickland explained
that the determination of competence must focus on the time of the trial
because to do otherwise "could dampen the ardor and impair the indepen-
dence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and
undermine the trust between attorney and client. '2 34 The Fretwell Court
reasoned that the prejudice component does not implicate these concerns
because it focuses on the overall fairness of the proceeding and reliability of
the result; therefore, the use of hindsight is acceptable.235
Although a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's errors under-
mined confidence in the outcome to establish prejudice,236 Strickland
largely defined when errors rise to this level through its outcome-determi-
nation test. The Court stated that the "appropriate test for prejudice" is
whether there is a reasonable probability that counsel's errors adversely af-
fected the outcome of the proceeding.237 Strickland directed courts to as-
sess outcome determination from "the totality of the evidence before the
judge or jury,"238 and this language establishes the time of trial as the frame
of reference for evaluating outcome determination. Common sense also
230. Id. at 846 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 482 n.3
(1974)).
231. See supra notes 41, 46-47 and accompanying text.
232. Fretwell v. Lockhart, 739 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (E.D. Ark. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
233. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844.
234. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
235. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 193-97.
237. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
238. Id. at 695.
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dictates that hindsight has no role in determining the impact of counsel's
errors upon the outcome.
Even if outcome determination does not establish prejudice automati-
cally, as Fretwell declared,239 Strickland clearly holds that a "breakdown"
in the adversarial process renders the result of the proceeding unreliable.'
Again, a court must look to the time of trial to determine if counsel's mis-
takes were so egregious as to upset the adversarial balance. Nowhere does
Strickland define prejudice apart from the harm a defendant suffered at trial.
The entire premise behind Strickland and the right to effective counsel is
the protection the defendant's right to a fair trial. A defendant is denied a
fair trial when the prosecution's evidence is not subject to meaningful ad-
versary testing. Quite rightly, this determination should not the benefit of
hindsight. To suggest that a subsequent change in the law in any way alters
the quality of counsel's performance or the harm a defendant suffered at
trial would be disingenuous.
Fretwell does not focus, however, on the effects of attorney errors on
the outcome of the proceeding or on the adversarial balance at trial. As
discussed above, Fretwell represents a situation in which the Court deter-
mined there was no possibility that prejudice resulted from counsel's er-
rors.241 Although Strickland provided the exclusion of "lawless
decisionmakers" to preclude these same claims, as noted previously, this
passage cannot be interpreted as rendering a once "lawful" decision invalid
on the basis of hindsight.242 Instead of interpreting this aspect of Strickland
to permit hindsight, the Court chose to articulate a separate "rights require-
ment," not found in Strickland, that allowed for the flexibility to evaluate
the scope of a defendant's rights from the vantage point of current law.
The Court's use of hindsight may reflect the view of prejudice sug-
gested by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Kimmelman v. Morri-
son-only errors that undermine the accuracy of the result serve to
establish prejudice under Strickland.243 The Fretwell Court clearly did not
intend to go this far. Instead, the Court emphasized that the right to effec-
tive counsel exists to protect fairness in the adversary process; when coun-
sel's inadequate performance upsets the adversarial balance at trial, the
result of the proceeding is rendered unreliable.2" In this regard, Fretwell
reaffirms Strickland's recognition that a defendant is entitled to counsel
who not only protects against truly inaccurate outcomes, but also attempts
239. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842.
240. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
241. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
243. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 395 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); see also
supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Powell's reasoning).
244. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842.
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to obtain the best result possible, absent illegality, for her client.2 45 When
counsel fails to perform as an effective advocate, both Strickland and
Fretwell declare that the result is unreliable and prejudice exists.246 As
long as a defendant has a valid right, for example, to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Fretwell does not change
the fact that counsel's failure to assert her client's interest effectively can
undermine the reliability of the verdict or sentence without regard to the
overall accuracy of the result.
By refusing to limit the prejudice inquiry to the time of trial, the
Fretwell Court increased the risk of inconsistent determinations of ineffec-
tiveness. If prejudice is to be evaluated under current law, what would hap-
pen if the law were to change again? This situation almost occurred on the
exact issue that Fretwell presented when, in its October 1993 term, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments in Tennessee v.
Middlebrooks.247 Middlebrooks posed the question of whether the "double-
counting" of aggravating circumstances violates the Eighth Amendment,241
but was dismissed without decision on the basis that certiorari was improvi-
dently granted. 49 If the Court were to declare the practice of "double-
counting" unconstitutional, several questions would be raised. Could it still
deny Fretwell the right to a Collins objection? Would Collins regain the
status of "correct" law, while Fretwell's death sentence remained reliable
and fair? Could another habeas petitioner who happened to raise the same
claim of ineffectiveness at a later date establish prejudice in light of the new
ruling? Any principled application of Fretwell's prejudice analysis would
determine that prejudice exists when the present state of the law favors the
defendant, and this application could result in inequitable treatment of simi-
larly situated defendants. Although the Court should be commended for
announcing a clear "rights" standard to determine when counsel's errors did
not undermine confidence in the outcome, to maintain consistency, this in-
quiry should look to the time of trial to determine if counsel's errors de-
prived the defendant of a fair trial.
245. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-98 (1984) (establishing prejudice when
counsel's errors adversely affect the outcome of the proceeding or cause a "breakdown" in the
adversarial process at trial).
246. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-98.
247. 113 S. Ct. 1840, cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 651 (1993).
248. State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1992), cert. granted sub nom. Tennessee
v. Middlebrooks, 113 S. Ct. 1840, cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 651 (1993).
249. Middlebrooks, 114 S. Ct. at 651. In State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1993), the
Tennessee Supreme Court noted that Middlebrooks was based on the Tennessee state constitution,
not the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 259 n.7. Thus, the Supreme
Court dismissed certiorari because Middlebrooks was decided on independent and adequate state
grounds. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983).
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Just as Justice O'Connor predicted, the Court's decision in Fretwell
has not dramatically altered the prejudice inquiry under Strickland.
Although lower courts require the petitioner to show that "counsel's defi-
cient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding
fundamentally unfair,""2  most courts have either addressed overall fairness
and reliability in addition to the outcome-determination test"' or simply
equated outcome determination to fundamental fairness.252 A few decisions
have examined prejudice without reference to outcome determination." 3
Apparently no court has utilized hindsight to evaluate prejudice or has de-
termined that prejudice does not exist even though the defendant has estab-
lished outcome determination.
Alvemaz v. Ratelle254 is an example of a decision evaluating funda-
mental unfairness on the basis of whether the defendant established out-
come determination. In Alvernaz, defense counsel failed to inform the
defendant that if he refused an offered plea bargain for a five-year sentence,
he could face life imprisonment if convicted.255 Believing that the possible
sentence would not exceed a maximum of eight years, the defendant re-
jected the plea offer and received a life sentence when convicted at trial 5 6
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California held
that counsel's error rendered the proceeding unfair and the result unreliable
because the defendant demonstrated that, had he known the possible sen-
tence, he would have accepted the plea offer.257 Thus, the traditional out-
250. E.g., United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1283 (9th Cir. 1993); Jackson v. Lockhart,
992 F.2d 167, 169 (8th Cir. 1993); Alvemaz v. Ratelle, 831 F. Supp. 790, 797 (S.D. Cal. 1993);
United States v. Sims, 818 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (N.D. 111. 1993); see, e.g., Yarrington v. Davies,
992 F.2d 1077, 1079 (10th Cir. 1993); Hollenback v. United States, 987 F.2d 1272, 1275 (7th Cir.
1993); Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Lively, 817 F.
Supp. 453, 459 (D. Del. 1993), affid, No. 93-7307, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32797 (3d Cir. Nov.
12, 1993).
251. See Whitmore v. Lockhart, 8 F.3d 614, 622-24 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that the defendant
had not established outcome determination, then determining that counsel's errors had not ren-
dered the trial unfair or the result unreliable); Yarringlon, 992 F.2d at 1080-81 (reaching the same
result).
252. See Jackson, 992 F.2d at 169-70 (holding that unfairness and unreliability did not result
from counsel's failure to renew a motion for acquittal at the close of the evidence because it was
highly unlikely the court would have granted the motion).
253. See Novak v. Purkett, 4 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding no unfairness because
counsel informed the defendant of his right to appeal); Garcia, 997 F.2d at 1283 (bypassing an
outcome-determination analysis in favor of finding no fundamental unfairness); Holland, 992 F.2d
at 691 (determining that because the attorney was somewhat effective in his performance, errors,
even if deficient, did not render the trial unfair or its result unreliable).
254. 831 F. Supp. 790 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
255. Id. at 794.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 797.
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come determinative test formed the basis of the court's decision that
fundamental unfairness resulted.z 8
Two decisions have applied Fretwell in a non-capital sentencing con-
text and, apparently, have reached different results than Strickland would
yield. In Durrive v. United States,"9 the petitioner claimed that, had coun-
sel requested that the trial court properly apply the sentencing guidelines,
his ten-year sentence would have been reduced by a year.260 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that prejudice
would exist if it applied Strickland literally, because counsel's errors did
adversely affect the outcome.261 It concluded, however, that Fretwell re-
jected outcome determination as automatically establishing prejudice, and it
held that a possible one-year reduction in the sentence did not render the
entire sentence fundamentally unfair or unreliable.2 12 Similarly, in Spriggs
v. Collins,263 the Fifth Circuit addressed a misapplication of the sentencing
guidelines that resulted in a modest increase in the defendant's sentence. It
held that to constitute outcome determination under Strickland, counsel's
errors must have significantly affected the result of the proceeding.264 The
court reasoned that this alteration of Strickland was proper because Fretwell
determined that prejudice must be "rather appreciable before a new trial is
warranted. 265
These decisions illustrate the dangers the Fretwell Court created by
broadly announcing fundamental fairness, rather .than outcome determina-
tion, as the test for prejudice. These decisions fail to realize that Fretwell
did not reject Strickland's outcome determination test in place of "funda-
mental fairness," nor did it increase the defendant's burden in establishing
outcome determination. The Court simply reaffirmed under Strickland that,
in the limited situation in which there is no possibility that counsel's errors
undermined confidence in the result, outcome determination is not the
proper inquiry.26 6 As discussed above, Fretwell did not alter Strickland's
recognition that a defendant is entitled to counsel who obtains the most
favorable result possible for her client,267 and even a modest increase in the
defendant's sentence establishes outcome determination under Strickland.
Although these decisions represent a misapplication of Fretwell, several
258. Id.
259. 4 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1993).
260. Id. at 551.
261. Id. at 550-51.
262. Id. at 551.
263. 993 F.2d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1993).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 88 n.4.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 214-16.
267. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
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other courts have realized that Fretwell did not alter Strickland's basic pro-
nouncement that fairness in the adversary system is the benchmark in deter-
mining prejudicial error.268
A few courts have applied Fretwell's holding that a defendant must
demonstrate that counsel's errors deprived him of a right to which he is
entitled. The defendant in United States v. Sims 6 9 claimed that counsel's
poor advice caused him to plead guilty.270 Rejecting the assertion that
counsel's performance was unreasonable and concluding that the defendant
did not demonstrate outcome determination, the district court stated that the
defendant was not deprived of a substantive or procedural right because
there is no entitlement to a conscious waiver with respect to each
defense. 271
Perhaps more on point with Fretwell is United States v. Garcia,27 in
which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that fundamental un-
fairness did not result from counsel's failure to cite an inapplicable law that
would have produced a more favorable result for the defendant.2 73
Although the court did not explain its reasoning,274 it could have held that
because the case did not control, the defendant did not have a right to bene-
fit from it. Just as easily, the court could have found that the defendant
claimed the "luck of a lawless decisionmaker" by asserting the benefit of an
irrelevant law. If this case had arisen prior to Fretwell, the "lawlessness"
aspect of Strickland would have prevented the defendant from arguing out-
come determination. Thus, Garcia illustrates how Fretwell's "rights re-
quirement" mirrors the "lawlessness" prohibited by Strickland.
Although the Fretwell Court sought to resolve the unique situation in
which the defendant claimed the benefit of a law that was subsequently
overruled, it may have established a dangerous precedent. The Court cor-
rectly held that "fundamental fairness" is the overriding concern when eval-
uating prejudice, but it failed to clarify that outcome determination remains
268. See Resnover v. Pearson, 965 F.2d 1453, 1460 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Strickland requires us to
focus, not upon whether counsel could have done a better job, but upon whether counsel provided
the assistance necessary to ensure the fundamental fairness of the proceeding."), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2935 (1993); Novak v. Purkett, 4 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1993) (requiring that counsel's
errors prejudice the defendant to such an extent that the "adversarial process is rendered unrelia-
ble"); English v. United States, 998 F.2d 609, 613 (8th Cir. 1993) (focusing on whether attorney
errors were "so prejudicial that the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution is upset,
and the verdict is rendered suspect"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 573 (1993); Albanese v. McGinnis,
823 F. Supp. 521, 534 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (stating that a court must ask whether "the attorney's
performance was adequate to allow the adversarial process to operate in the particular case").
269. 818 F. Supp. 1199 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
270. Id. at 1201-02.
271. Id. at 1203.
272. 997 F.2d 1273, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1993).
273. Id. at 1283-84.
274. Id. at 1284.
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the test except in situations where it can be said that counsel's errors did not
undermine confidence in the outcome. The Court's declaration that out-
come determination does not automatically establish prejudice may reduce
the centrality of the test and encourage lower courts to deviate from Strick-
land when evaluating prejudice.
The Court wisely concluded that if counsel's errors do not undermine
confidence in the outcome, prejudice cannot exist; the Court should be
commended for establishing a clear "rights" standard to evaluate this possi-
bility. What is questionable, however, is the Court's use of hindsight to
evaluate the scope of a defendant's rights. The Court's conclusion that
counsel only deprived Fretwell of the opportunity to have "the state court
make an error in his favor"27 does not adequately address the harm he
actually suffered-receiving a death sentence rather than life imprisonment
solely on the basis of attorney error. Clearly, the adversarial process broke
down at Fretwell's sentencing hearing when counsel failed to object to the
impermissible aggravating circumstance. The subsequent change in the law
did not affect the nature of the proceeding.
Strickland never contemplated the use of hindsight to determine preju-
dice; it specifically fixed the time of trial as the reference for its outcome-
determination test and clearly focuses on the adversarial process at trial.
The only other aspect of Strickland's prejudice analysis is the exclusion of
"lawless decisionmakers." The Court quite clearly defined the term to
mean one who falls to apply the governing law. Thus, Fretwell's use of
hindsight to evaluate the extent of prejudice suffered serves to alter, rather
than clarify the meaning of prejudice under Strickland.
The use of hindsight to evaluate prejudice not only deviates from pre-
cedent, but also creates the potential for grave injustice and inconsistent
determinations. Not only may a defendant who receives ineffective counsel
at trial be denied relief, but the possibility that the law will change again, in
his favor, also renders him unable to remedy an invalid verdict or sentence.
In addition, the use of hindsight poses the threat that a future change in law
will provide relief for some, yet, by virtue of timing, deny relief to others,
It would seem that rationality and consistency demand that prejudice be
assessed at the time of the trial.
JENNIFER N. FOSTER
275. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 843 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 10 (No.
91-1393)).
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